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nearly a century and the continued existence of the tavern busi-
ness in those states having such statutes. This risk can be cal-
culated in advance, insured against, and distributed among the
consuming public, through prices, as a cost of the business.
Tavern keepers, who operate their business by way of privilege
rather than right, can always avoid liability by observing their
statutory obligations.
Wellborn Jack, Jr.
TORTS - MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - NOTICE OF DEFECTS IN
SIDEWALKS CREATED BY MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Plaintiff sued the City of New Orleans to recover for injuries
sustained when she stepped on a defective water meter cover
located on a portion of the sidewalk. The cover had been broken
approximately twenty-two days earlier by employees of the city's
park commission engaged in trimming a tree, and this defect had
been pointed out to the employees doing the work. The trial
court allowed recovery on the ground that the city had failed to
repair a dangerous condition in the sidewalk within a reasonable
time after gaining knowledge of the condition. On appeal to the
Louisiana court of appeal, held, affirmed. Notice of the defect to
the agency creating it is sufficient to impose upon the city the
duty of repairing the defect within a reasonable time. Haindel
v. Sewerage & Water Board, 115 So.2d 871 (La. App. 1959).1
As a general rule, municipal corporations are considered
immune from tort liability in performance of governmental func-
tions, but are not immune when performing proprietary func-
tions.2 Municipalities have generally been held liable on several
theories for failure to use reasonable care in maintaining streets
1. Dismissal of the suit as against the sewerage and water board was not
appealed by the plaintiff; so the court of appeal was concerned only with the
appeal by the city.
2. Barber Laboratories v. New Orleans, 227 La. 104, 78 So.2d 525 (1955)
Howard v. New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925) ; McSheridan v. Talla-
dega, 243 Ala. 162, 8 So.2d 831 (1942) ; Peavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629, 1 So.2d
614 (1941) ; Gullikson v. McDonald, 62 Minn. 278, 64 N.W. 812 (1895). See 63
C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 746 (1950) ; Notes, 18 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW'
756 (1958), 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 812 (1956) ; Fordham & Pegues, Local
Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW Rzvlw 720,
721-31 (1941).
The distinction between governmental, as compared with proprietary, functions
is not entirely clear. Generally a governmental function is one traditionally per-
formed by the state for the health, safety, and welfare of citizens, and not for
profit; such as fire and police protection, free garbage service, and maintenance
of public parks. Proprietary functions may or may not be profitable, but they
are usually paid for by the users and are not considered as traditionally performed
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and sidewalks.3 Many jurisdictions classify street maintenance
as a proprietary function, thus imposing liability.4 Louisiana
and other states recognize that street maintenance is a govern-
mental function and treat liability in this area as an exception
to the general immunity rule.5 The courts require either actual
or constructive notice to the municipality of the dangerous con-
dition before liability can be imposed.6 A municipal corporation
is considered as having actual notice of a street or sidewalk de-
fect whenever the condition is known by an officer or employee
having a responsibility toward keeping streets and sidewalks in
good repair, or having a duty to report such defects to the proper
authorities.7 A municipality has constructive notice of a defect
solely by governmental units. Examples are operation of public utilities and trans-
portation systems.
3. Weinhardt v. New Orleans, 125 La. 351, 51 So. 286 (1910); Gueble v.
Town of Lafayette, 121 La. 909, 46 So. 917 (1908) ; Lorenz v. New Orleans, 114
La. 802, 38 So. 566 (1905) ; Aucoin v. New Orleans, 105 La. 271, 29 So. 502(1901) ; O'Neill v. New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 220 (1878) ; White v. City of Alex-
andria, 35 So.2d 810 (La. App. 1948) ; Hebert v. New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La.
App. 1935) ; Miller v. New Orleans, 152 So. 141 (La. App. 1934) ; Geismar v.
City of Alexandria, 142 So. 367 (La. App. 1932) ; City of Bessemer v. Brantley,
258 Ala. 675, 65 So.2d 160 (1953) ; Glasgow v. City of St. Joseph, 353 Mo. 740,
184 S.W.2d 412 (1945) ; Owens v. Seattle, 49 Wash.2d 187, 299 P.2d 560 (1956).
See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.7 (1956) ; 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corpora-
tions § 782 (1950) ; Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort
in Louisiana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720, 731 (1941).
4. Johnson v. Opelika, 260 Ala. 551, 71 So.2d 793 (1954) ; Dorminey v. City
of Montgomery, 232 Ala. 47, 166 So. 689 (1936) ; Pardini v. City of Reno, 50
Nev. 392, 263 Pac. 768 (1928) ; Shepherd v. City of Chattanooga, 168 Tenn. 153,
76 S.W.2d 322 (1934) ; City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S.W.2d
480 (1943). See 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations § 782, n. 24 (1950) ; 19 Mc-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54.03, n. 21 (3d ed. 1950).
5. Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 114 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1959)
Carsey v. New Orleans, 181 So. 819 (La. App. 1938) ; Miller v. New Orleans, 152
So. 141 (La. App. 1934) ; Klingenberg v. City of Raleigh, 212 N.C. 549, 194 S.E.
297 (1937) ; Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 66 P.2d 1152 (1937).
See 2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 29.7, n. 9 (1956) ; 63 C.J.S., Municipal Corpora-
tions § 782, n. 25 (1950) ; 19 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54.03, n. 19
(3d ed. 1950) ; Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in
Louisiana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720, 731 (1941).
6. District of Columbia v. Chessin, 73 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1934) ; Hudgens v.
New Orleans, 54 So.2d 536 (La. App. 1951) ; Cobb v. Town of Winnsboro, 49
So.2d 625 (La. App. 1950) ; Parker v. New Orleans, 1 So.2d 123 (La. App. 1941) ;
Carsey v. New Orleans, 181 So. 819 (La. App. 1938). See 2 HARPER & JAMES,
TORTS § 29.7(2) (1956) ; 19 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54.102
(1950).
7. See Weinhardt v. New Orleans, 125 La. 351, 51 So. 286 (1910) (notice to
city councilman constituted actual notice to the city) ; Miller v. New Orleans, 152
So. 141 (La. App. 1934) (notice to department of public property held proper
notice; dicta indicated that notice to city street repair engineer, or to complaint
clerk in municipal repair plant would have been sufficient) ; Landry v. New Or-
leans Public Service, 149 So. 136 (La. App. 1933) ; Geismar v. City of Alex-
andria, 142 So. 367 (La. App. 1932) (dicta indicated that knowledge by policeman
of dangerous condition on beat would be actual notice to the city) ; Collins v.
Lyons, 120 So. 418 (La. App. 1929) (notice to policeman of defect not on his
beat not notice to the city because he had no duty toward repairing or reporting
the defect) ; Barnes v. New Orleans, 4 La. App. 503, 505 (1926) ("Of course, it
was necessary that her communication would have reached some official charged
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when it has existed for such a period of time that it would have
been discovered and repaired had the city exercised reasonable
care." In reality, liability in such cases is based on breach of the
duty of reasonable inspection of sidewalks and streets for de-
fects and dangers,9 but the courts still retain notice terminology
by labeling these circumstances as constructive notice.
Prior notice is not necessary where municipal employees do
work necessarily involving the creation of a condition dangerous
to street and sidewalk users. 10 Thus a city may be liable without
prior notice when it creates an excavation or other dangerous
condition in or near a street or sidewalk." Liability under such
circumstances is apparently based on the fact that the city is a
peril-maker,1 2 although some courts say that liability is imposed
because the municipality is considered as having knowledge of
its own acts.13
with the duty of making repairs to sidewalks"). See also 19 MCQUILLIN, MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS § 54.106-54.107 (3d ed. 1950) ; Fordham & Pegues, Local Gov-
ernment Responsibility in Tort in Louisiana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720, 736
(1941) ; 13 R.C.L., Ilighways § 283 (1916), cited with approval in Miller v. New
Orleans, 152 So. 141, 144 (La. App. 1934).
8. Smith v. District of Columbia, 189 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Smith v.
New Orleans, 135 La. 980, 66 So. 319 (1914) ; Gueble v. Town of Lafayette, 121
La. 909, 46 So. 917 (1908) ; Lorenz v. New Orleans, 114 La. 802, 38 So. 566
(1905) ; White v. City of Alexandria, 35 So.2d 810 (La. App. 1948) ; McQuillan
v. New Orleans, 18 So.2d 218 (La. App. 1944) ; Robinson v. City of Alexandria,
174 So. 681 (La. App. 1937); Hebert v. New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La. App.
1935); Geismar v. City of Alexandria, 142 So. 367 (La. App. 1932); City of
Hattiesburg v. Hillman, 222 Miss. 443, 76 So.2d 368 (1954) ; City of Lincoln v.
Smith, 28 Neb. 762, 45 N.W. 41 (1890). See 19 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 54.109 (3d ed. 1950).
9. See Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisi-
ana, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 720, 737 (1941). Constructive notice has been
analogized to the duty of reasonable inspection owed invitees by owners and occu-
piers of land. See Hebert v. New Orleans, 163 So. 425, 426 (La. App. 1935).
10. City of Covington v. DeMolay, 248 Ky. 814, 60 S.W.2d 123 (1933) ; Led-
better v. City of Great Falls, 123 Mont. 270, 213 P.2d 246 (1949) ; City of Lincoln
v. Calvert, 39 Neb. 305, 58 N.W. 115 (1894) ; Crandall v. City of Amsterdam, 254
App. Div. 39, 4 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1938); Elrod v. Franklin, 140 Tenn. 228, 204
S.W. 298 (1918). See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.7(2) (1956) ; 19 MCQUIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54.104 (3d ed. 1950).
11. See Lemoine v. City of Alexandria, 151 La. 562, 92 So. 58 (1922) (city
ordered employees to place cross-ties on sidewalk) ; Nessen v. New Orleans, 134
La. 455, 64 So. 286 (1914) (municipality had wires strung along sidewalk to keep
people off the streets during Mardi Gras) ; Carlisle v. Parish of East Baton Rouge,
114 So.2d 62 (La. App. 1959) (dangerous condition in surface of street caused by
street repairs); Weil v. City of Alexandria, 7 La. App. 387 (1928) (city em-
ployees dug excavation between street and sidewalk).
12. Nevala v. City of Ironwood, 232 Mich. 316, 320, 205 N.W. 93, 94 (1925)
("When, however, the dangerous condition is caused by agents of the city in the
prosecution of their employment, the rule of liability is not based on notice and
failure to repair, but upon the creation of a dangerous condition by the city.").
13. City of Birmingham v. Andrews, 27 Ala. App. 377, 172 So. 681 (1937)
City of Covington v. DeMolay, 248 Ky. 814, 60 S.W.2d 123 (1933) ; Ledbetter v.
City of Great Falls, 123 Mont. 270, 213 P.2d 246 (1949). See 63 C.J.S., Munici-
pal Corporations § 825 (1950).
NOTES
The instant case presents an interesting combination of both
actual notice and peril-maker situations. Recovery was not based
upon creation of a dangerous condition by city employees, pre-
sumably because the nature of the work did not necessarily in-
volve creation of the defect causing the injury.14 Rather, the
city was found negligent for failure to repair within a reasonable
time a dangerous sidewalk condition of which it was considered
as having actual notice. The court said that knowledge of the
defect by the employees here involved would not have been suffi-
cient had they not created the defect because they were not
charged with repairing such conditions. 15 However, the fact that
they had caused the condition was used to justify a finding of
actual notice.16
It might be inferred that the court is recognizing a duty on
the part of municipal employees to report to the proper authori-
ties all street and sidewalk dangers known to and created by
them as an unnecessary incident to their work. Whatever the
interpretation may be, it is submitted that granting recovery
under the circumstances of the instant case at least indicates
that municipal liability for defects in streets and sidewalks will
not be construed narrowly in Louisiana.
The instant case represents a diminution of governmental
tort immunity by broadening the street and sidewalk exception.
It should be noted that the doctrine of governmental tort im-
munity has been unpopular for many years and has been almost
continuously criticized." So unpopular has it become in recent
14. See LaGroue v. New Orleans, 114 La. 253, 38 So. 160 (1905) (city not
liable for injuries from defect created by independent contractor engaged by the
city because creation of the defect was not necessary in performing the work). If
the rule in this case applies to municipal employees also, creation of the defect
must be necessary in accomplishing the work authorized, ordered, or permitted by
the municipality before it can be held liable without notice.
It should be noted that where injury was caused by negligence of municipal
employees performing street maintenance, as distinguished from injury from de-
fects, cities are not liable in jurisdictions which consider street maintenance a
governmental function. Prunty v. Shreveport, 223 La. 475, 66 So.2d 3 (1953) ;
Mardis v. Des Moines, 240 Iowa 105, 34 N.W.2d 620 (1948) ; Parker v. Wichita,
150 Kan. 249, 92 P.2d 86 (1939). Contra, Ronaldson & Puckett v. Baton Rouge,
3 La. App. 509 (1925) (city liable for negligent operation of a street sprinkling
truck resulting in collision with another vehicle); but in Norred v. Shreveport,
90 So.2d 571 (La. App. 1956), the Ronaldson case is criticized as being out of
line. The Norred case held a municipality not liable for negligent operation of a
street sweeping machine because a health measure, thus a governmental function.
15. Haindel v. Sewerage & Water Board, 115 So.2d 871, 877 (La. App. 1959).
16. Id. at 878.
17. See Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924)
Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Imnunity, 13 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEw 476, 494 (1953) ; 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 29.1, n. 2 (1956) ;
Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1198, 1199, n. 4 (1958) ; Note, 71 HARv. L. REV. 744, 745,
n. 6 (1958).
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years that some jurisdictions have abandoned the whole immu-
nity doctrine.18
Robert A. Hawthorne, Jr.
TORTS - PRENATAL INJURIES - CHARACTERIZATION OF UNBORN
CHILD AS A "PERSON" IMMATERIAL TO RECOVERY
Action was brought by an infant plaintiff for injuries sus-
tained while in the womb of his mother, resulting from an auto-
mobile collision due to defendants' negligence. Plaintiff was
born seventy-five days after the accident with deformities of
his legs and feet. The trial court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss on the ground that New Jersey recognized no cause
of action for prenatal injuries. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of New Jersey, held, reversed and remanded for trial. An infant
has a legally protected interest in beginning life with a healthy
body. If another's wrongful conduct causes him to be born de-
formed, the infant may recover damages. Though not at issue,
the court indicated that the infant need not have been viable at
the moment of injury in order to state a cause of action. Smith
v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960).
For fifty years after the first unsuccessful attempt to recover
for prenatal injuries,1 most such actions were dismissed on the
ground that the common law did not recognize the unborn child
as an entity capable of being wronged by another's tortious
conduct.2  Recently however, judicial thinking on this subject
18. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957),
noted in 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 756 (1958), 71 HARv. L. REV. 744 (1958) ;
Ragans v. Jacksonville, 106 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958) ; Schuster v. City of New
York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1958), noted in 19 LoUisi-
ANA LAW REVIEW 910 (1959), 59 COLUM. L. REV. 487 (1959) ; 72 HARv. L. REV.
1386 (1959); 33 TuL. L. REV. 723 (1959).
Louisiana might possibly abandon or modify the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in the near future. The cases of Duree v. Maryland Casualty Co., 238 La. 166, 114
So.2d 594 (1959), and Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Board, 238 La.
388, 115 So.2d 793 (1959), decided within a few months of the instant case (No-
vember 30, 1959), have created quite a furor. See McMahon & Miller, The Crain
Myth -A Criticism of the Duree and Stephens Cases, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
449 (1960), which treats these cases as a temporary set-back in the increasing
decay of governmental tort immunity and suggests enactment of laws to overrule
the Duree and Stephens cases and to modify the sovereign immunity doctrine in
Louisiana.
1. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
2. See ibid.; Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). A com-
mon law view of the unborn child is found in 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
129-30. Perhaps this position was fortified in the minds of some judges by grave
doubts that dependable proof of causal connection could be produced. For ex-
ample, "What field would be opened to extravagance of testimony already great
enough-if Science could carry her lamp, not over certain in its light where
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